Case Comments by Kentucky Law Journal
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 16 | Issue 3 Article 7
1928
Case Comments
Kentucky Law Journal
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kentucky Law Journal (1928) "Case Comments," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 16 : Iss. 3 , Article 7.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol16/iss3/7
CASE COMMENTS
CARRIERS-EVIDENCE OF TRAnmAN'S NEGLIGENCE IN FAILING TO AN-
1IOCIPATE THAT PASSENGER WOULD SHOOT FELOW PASSENGER, HELD IT-
SUFFICIENT FOR Juny.-The appellant was a passenger of the defendant
.carrier. While the train was slowing down for a stop and when the
trainmen were at the other end Of the train, appellant was shot by an
intoxicated passenger. It was not shown that the passenger had cre-
zted any disturbance before this, other than that he had talked garrul-
ously, and tipped over a few of the passengers' hats. He had not given
the conductor any cause for quieting him before the shooting. At the
time of -the shooting, he had suddenly risen from his seat, drawn his
revolver, fatally shot one passenger, wounded another, and then shot
appellant who was attempting to make his escape. Held, that from
the conduct of the fellow passenger, there was not enough evidence to
submit to the jury that carrier had been negligent in failing to antici-
pate that the passenger would shoot the appellant. Peak v. Louisville
& . By Co, 221 Ky. 97, 297 S. W. 1107.
The Court of Appeals in its opinion discussed the general doctrine
that carriers are not insurers of the absolute safety of their passen-
gers, -or of -their entire immunity from the misconduct of fellow passen-
gers, though there is an implied obligation growing out of the contract
between the carrier and the passenger that the former shall afford the
latter reasonable protection and immunity from -the insults, violence
and wanton interference of fellow passengers, intruders, or the carrier's
servants, and where a carrier fails to perform this duty it is responsi-
ble. Kinney v. Louisville and. X. By. Co., 99 Ky. 59, 343 S. W. 1066;
Louisville Ry. Co. v. Wellington, 137 Ky. 719, 126 S. W. 370, but if a
passenger has been assaulted under circumstances that could not have
been reasonably anticipated by the carrler in time to prevent the assault,
the carrier is not responsible. Louisville B. Co. v. Brewer, 147 Ky. 166,
143 S. W. 1074, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 647; Payne, Agent v. Moor, 196 Ky.
454, 244 S. W. 869. In the last mentioned case the circumstances are
identically the same as in the principal case, with the exception that in
the latter a lunatic was dealt with instead of an intoxicant.
The court does not appear to lay any particular stress on the car-
rier's knowledge of -the passenger's intoxicated condition, as evidence
of the carrier's neglect to take precautions toward safeguarding the
other passengers from any possible injury, which might have resulted
from the intoxicant's condition. Other jurisdictions do not appear to be
quite as -tolerant of a carrier's not anticipating what acts or injury an
intoxicated passenger might do to fellow passengers. In Oklahoma, the
falling of an intoxicated passenger was evidence enough to submit to
the jury that carrier should have foreseen that the passenger might do
injury to other passengers. Montgomery Traction Co. v. Whitley, 152
Ala. 101, 44 So. 538. In Missouri the carrier's negligence, in allowing
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an intoxicated person to crowd into a coach and injure a fellow passen-
ger, was held to be a question for the jury. Abernathy v. Missouri Pac.
R. Co., 217 S. W. 568. In Texas the court held that there was evidence
enough of carrier's negligence to go to the jury, where smoking and.
drinking male passengers were allowed to crowd up against a fellow
passenger and injure her. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Bratcher, 78 S. W. 531-
A Pennsylvania ruling conforms to the Kentucky view, however. There
it was held that there was not sufficient evidence to go to the jury of
carrier's negligence in allowing an intoxicated passenger to enter a
coach, where he injured a fellow passenger. Brehony v. Pottsville
Union Traction Co., 218 Pa. 123, 66 A. 1066.
Some question might be raised as to the soundness of the court's
holding in drawing no distinction between a carrier's negligence in
regard to a lunatic, and as regards its negligence toward an intoxicant.
Had the court held otherwise, however, it would have laid down what
would seem to be a severe and unfair rule, in requiring the carrier to
anticipate and be responsible for the acts of an intoxicant, when his
conduct prior to the acts committed did not warrant any suspicion of
what he might do. H. C. C.
CAunmES-PAssENGER CAREEsSLY on, AlISTAXENIY TAKING THE
WRONG TnAin MAY PROPERLY BE EJECTED, THOUGH, iF HE HAS BEEN AIIS-
LED BY CARRIER's AGENTS, HE CAN RECOVER FOR SUBSEQUENT EECTIO.-
Appellee, just out of a hospital where he had undergone an operation
for, appendicitis, purchased a ticket to a station on appellant's line at
its depot and, on showing his ticket to -the guard at the gate, was told
to take the train on track 8 and on presenting his ticket to the agent
in charge of loading passengers on that train, he was told by him to
get aboard. When the conductor saw his ticket, shortly after the train
started, he told appellee he was on the wrong train, and though in-
formed of his weakened and ill condition, the conductor ejected ap-
pellee from the train in the yards about a mile from the depot. It was
raining and appellee was forced to walk through the yards to the depot,
causing him great anxiety and pain and firitating his wound so that
he was obliged to return to the hospital to have the incision treated for
some time further. Held, .that while the passenger under the general
rule must inform himself as -to whether or not the train which he is
about to take will stop at his destintion before boarding it and is with-
out remedy if he afterwards learns that it will not stop at his destina-
tion, the rule" does not apply to a passenger who has boarded the train
pursuant to the directions of the company's agents who have examined
his ticket in the course of their duties, and if he is thereafter ejected
the rule allows him to recover. LouisviZle & X. R. Co. v. Hawkins, 219-
Ky. 400, 293 S. W. 972.
The theory -for the exception here Is that the railroad, through its
authorized agents, has made a special contract with the passenger to
stop Its train at his destination and must fulfill it. Dillman v. Chicago,.
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etc. B. Co., (Ind.) 88 N. E. 873. Practically all authorities agree in
this holding in the absence of statutes to the contrary, the divergence of
opinion being due to a different conception of the power of the agent to
make the special contract. Thus, where a ticket agent informs a pas-
senger that a -train will stop at a station which is not on its schedule,
some courts hold that the purchaser may rely on the agent's statement
and the carrier Is bound by it, -as in Olsen v. Yorthern Pac. R. Co., 49
Wash. 626, 96 Pac. 150, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 209, in which the court said:
"While there is some conflict in the authorities bearing on this question,
the better rule is that a passenger has a right to rely on a ticket agent,
and is not bound, as a matter of law, to read or examine his transporta-
tion before taking the train." "It is for the jury to say whether the
passenger is guilty of negligence in not discovering the mistake of the
agent before taking the train," etc. The New Jersey courts are flatly
opposed to this view for the reason given in ,Shelton. v. Erie B. Co., 73
N. J. Law 558, 66 Atl. 403, that the scope of the ticket agent's authority
is notoriously limited to selling tickets and "by no rule of the law of
agency or of evidence can the acts or statements of a ticket agent
beyond the scope of his limited authority be erected into a contract
binding upon the railroad: company." The Kentucky court in L. & X.
Ry. v. Scott, 141 Ky. 538, 133 S. W. 800, holds that the giving of informa-
tion regarding trains is within the scope of the ticket agent's employ-
ment; that the public has a right to rely on such statements and that
the company is bound by the contracts made by him in its behalf by
such statements. The principal case follows the ruling in L. & X. R.
Co. v. Summers, 133 Ky. 684, 118 S. W. 926, cited in the opinion, which
ia in accord with the weight of authority. The cases cited above show
that all jurisidictions agree in holding the carrier liable where a special
contract with the passenger can be made out, but that courts differ as
to the power of certain agents to make such contracts. G. L. B.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-1ORTGAGF TO BE RECORDED MUST BE DErosiTED
iN PoPRz Orrics WITHI SOMEONE HAVING AUTHORITY TO RECEIVE IT AND
REdOILDING FEES MUST BE PAID.-A, the purchaser of an automobile, ex-
ecuted his promissory note for the unpaid purchase price. At -the same
time he executed a chattel mortgage to secure the payment of -the note.
The note and mortgage were sold, transferred, and assigned to the ap-
pellant. The appellant later mailed the mortgage with -the check to
cover the recording charges to the clerk of the county court. The check,
bearing the indorsement of the clerk of the court, was returned. Later
1. appeared that A had misappropriated funds of the appellee and, to
recover the funds so misappropriated, the appellee caused an attach-
ment to issue which was levied on the automobile. The appellant con-
tended its mortgage lien was superior to that created by the attach-
ment. The mortgage assigned to appellants did not appear on the
records of the county court. Held, it is a sufficient recording if the
mortgage be deposited in the proper office with a person having author-
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ity to receive it and the recording fees have been paid. Carter Guaranty
Co. v. Cumberland & Manchester Railroad Co., 219 Ky. 207, 292 S. W.
812.
The Kentucky Statute, section 496, providing that an unrecorded
mortgage shall not be valid against a purchaser for a valuable consid-
oration without notice, or against creditors, does not require that the
mortgagee personally supervise recording of the instrument, but the
mortgage must be deposited in thie proper office with some one having
authority to receive it and the recording fees must be paid. When it
is delivered in the proper office and the fees paid and directions given
to record it, it then becomes notice to all persons of the lien set out
therein. Kentucky River Coal Corporations v. Sumner, 195 Ky. 119, 241
S. W. 820; Herndon v. Ogg, 27 Kentucky Law Reports 268, 84 S. W.
754; Webb v. Austin, 22 Kentucky Law Reports 764, 58 S. W. 808; Great
Western Petroleum Co. v. Samson, 192 Ky. 814, 234 S. W. 712; Cain v.
Gray, 146 Ky. 402, 142 S. W. 715.
To constitute a valid filing for record, the 'instrument must be
delivered at the office where it is required to be filed. In Day and Con-
gleton Lumber Co. v. Mack, 139 Ky. 587, 69 S. W. 712, it was so held.
An instrument is ordinarily deemed to be recorded when it Is left
by its holder with the proper officer for the purpose of having it re-
corded. If after a deed is left with a clerk to be recorded he delivers
It to the grantor without recording It, it does not vitiate the deed. It
is sufficient filing if proved to have been acknowledged and lodged with
the clerk to be recorded. Commonwealth, Bank v. Haggin, 1 A. K.
Marsh. (Ky.) 306.
A clerk's indorsement on an Instrument to the effect that it has
been lodged for record is conclisive that this was done. A mortgage
Is valid against a purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice
where it has been acknowledged and lodged for record although it has
not been actually recorded, and the clerk's indorsement on the mortgage
that it has been so acknowledged and lodged for record is conclusive of
that fact. Webb v. Austin, supra.
It is obvious then that the duty of a mortgagee ends when he de-
posits thd Instrument to be recorded with the proper officer In his ac-
custdmed place of doing business, and the recording fees provided for
by statute have been paid. It follows that if the mortgagee has de-
posited the instrument for recording, and for some reason it is not
spread upon the pages of the proper book, the mortgagee will be re-
lieved of any responsibilities incident to such failure. A. K. R.
CORPORATIONS-ILLEGALITY OF ULTRA VmiEs NOTES AFFECTED OiLY
CoRPonATIoN AND NOT BA-N TAKING THEM WITHOUT NOTICE OF ILLEGAL-
xTY.-Notes were Issued by a corporation in excess of its charter-pre-
scribed limit of corporate indebtedness. Held, that the corporation only
was affected by .the ultra vires character of the notes and not the bank
taking the notes, as the bank was taking the notes without knowledge
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of the facts. Phoenix Third National Bank v. Martin, et a., 219 Ky.
579, 293 S. W. 1064.
The case in which -the rule of law quoted above is enunciated is of
chief importance in its decision as to the personal liabilities of the
directors of a corporation under Kentu6ky Statutes, section 550. While
the subject of this comment was of only secondary importance to the
final issues of the case, it raises problems of quite general importance
in the field of ultra vires transactions.
Although the bank had no actual knowledge of the facts, we may
wonder that the bank was not affected with constructive notice of the
charter limitations. To be sure the stricter and more technical iule
as to constructive notice of charter limitations of corporate power, such
as the debt limit, appears quite inconsistent with the result reached in
the present case. Such a view of the case is heightened when we con-
sider that the bank was one of the original parties to the note rather
than an innocent purchaser. The stricter rule was stated by Mitchell,
J., in Kraniger v. People's Building Society, 60 Minn. 94, 61 N. W. 904:
". .. the transaction was one which in and of itself assumed to create
an indebtedness on the part of the society in excess of the limit fixed
by its articles. The plaintiff was chargeable with notice of this latter
fact, for it is a settled rule that a person who deals with a corporation
must, it his peril, take notice of its charter or articles of association."
It has been pointed out, however, that such a strict adherence to
the earlier view as typified by the Kraiiger case is neither just nor
practicable. Ballantine on Private Corporations, page 279. All of the
mandates of present-day business require a more lenient rule. "It
would seem that the courts ought not to require persons contracting
with corporations to ascertain at their peril the line between intra Vires
and ultra vires, but merely to take reasonable notice of the nature of
the corporation and the customary scope of its business." Ballantine,
Supra. The present decision appears to follow the predicated trend of
the law in this regard.
An analogous distinction, and one quite fundamental to the one
here drawn, has been drawn by the courts between transactions wholly
without the scope of the corporate powers and transactions apparently
within the corporate powers. Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman
Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24.
While the result reached by the court in the present case deserves
only commendation, there may be those who would quarrel with the use
of the term illegal in describing the ultra vires character of the trans-
action. The use of the term would seem to indicate that -the tra'sac-
tion was wholly without the scope of the corporate powers at the very
least. Even in such an event the use of the term appears ill-advised.
Compare the opinions of Comstock, Ch. J., and Selden, J., in Bissell v.
Michigan Southern & X. I. R. Co., 22 N. Y. 258, with comments thereon
in Ballantine, 242ff. At best it appears a bit out of harmony with the
ultra-modern tone of the present decision to term the transaction
illegal. G. R.
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COUNTIES-FISCAL COURT, ACTING IN GOOD FAITH, MAY SFTTLE
CLAIms AGAINST SHEnRFS DuniNG PENDENCY OF TAXPAYERS' SUITS
TnERnoN.-Appellant brought an action against two former sheriffs
alleging that they had received compensation from their office far in ex-
cess of the.maximum salary designated by law. After a number of suits
the county court compromised the claim against the former officers. The
appellant contended that the county court had no authroity to com-
promise the claims as he, having brought the taxpayers' suit, was en-
titled to manage and control the course of the litigation .until the end.
Held, that the fiscal court, acting in good faith, had the power and
authority to enter into the compromise agreement settling the claims
growing out of the litigation. Shipp, for Use of Fayette County, et al.
v. Rodes, et al., 219 Ky. 349, 293 S. W. 542.
After quoting section 1834, Kentucky Statutes, and in referring to
section 1840, the court held that by these two sections of the statute
all right of action for and on behalf of the county is in the fiscal court;
and -that until that court refuses to institute a suit no one else may do
so. Commonwealth. v. Tilton, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1056, 48 S. W. 148.
It has been held that Kentucky Statutes, Sections 1834, 1839, and
1840, made the fiscal court the agency to look after the financial affairs
of the county and lodges with .the county judges and county attorneys
the primary right to institute and conduct all such cases and proceed-
ings looking to the preservation of the fiscal rights of the county.
Williams v. Stallard et al., 185 Ky. 10, 213 S. W. 197.
In Iowa, -the validity of a tax having been determined in an action
against a board of supervisors, who were the managing agents of the
county, it was held that an action to enjoin the collection of the tax
could not be brought by a taxpayer inasmuch as the board of super-
visors represented all the taxpayers of the county in the defense which
they made to the former action on the same ground. Lyman v. Fars,
53 Ia. 498, 5 N. W. 621. That a city may compromise a suit by taxpay-
ers against the city officials was held in -the Minnesota case of OaAkman
v. City of EveZeth, 163 Minn. 100, 203 N. W. 514.
Thus it will be seen, as consistently maintained, that the suit of a
single taxpayer will not prevail over the rights of a governing board,
county court, or other governing body which has as its legal function
the furthering of the rights of the taxpayers. A. K. R.
Cn miNAL LAw-REFuSING NEW TRIAL AFTER CONVICTION, IN DE-
FENDANT'S ABSENCE, HELD ERROR, WHERE DEFENDANT HAD DEFENSE, AND
PUNISHMENT FOR NONAPPEARANCE VwAS UNFAIR UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES.-
Appellant was convicted of violation of a Kentucky Statute, Section
3748, concerning misfeasance in office or willful neglect of duty by
county officials. Appellant was a constable of a magisterial district and
was informed by the prosecuting witness in this action that a moon-
shine still was located at or near the residence of the appellant, and
that he failed to seize or capture such still or to take any steps to
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effect the seizure of the still or of the owners and operators thereof.
The case had been continued at three terms of the court, -the appellant
being present and ready for a trial each time the case was continued.
The appellant was tried and convicted, he being absent from the county
at tbe time, and his punishment fixed -nt a fine of $1,000.00, the maximum
provided under the statute. His counsel filed a motion -for a new trial,
together with uncontroverted affidavits showing that appellant was not
guilty, which motion was overruled. Held, that the court abused its
discretion in refusing to grant appellant a new trial. Short v. Common-
-wealth, 221 Ky. 181, 298 S. W. 381.
When a motion is made to set aside a default judgment during the
term at which it was rendered, a rule prevails different from the one
when a new trial is sought after the term at which it was rendered on
the grounds of casualty or misfortune or where both litigants have par-
ticipated. The power of the court to set aside a default judgment at
the term at which it was rendered is inherent, and not dependent upon
sections of the Code regulating the granting of new trials. It is a
judicial discretion and depends upon whether or not the ends of justice
will be furthered thereby, gnd, in a measure, upon whether or not the
complainant has been guilty of laches. Southern Insurance Co. v.
John son, 140 Ky. 485, 131 S. W. 270; Stewart v. Commonwealth, 197 Ky.
501, 247 S. W. 357; Thompson v. First National Bank's Receiver, 183
Ky. 69, 203 S. W. 320; Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Kelly, 194 Ky. 153, 238
S. W. 334. Where a trial was had between eight and nine o'clock in
the morning in defendant's absence, due to motor trouble in going to
the court house, where he arrived about nine o'clock a. in., and at once
moved for a new trial while the witnesses were still present, and filed
an affidavit that he had a defense, It was held that the court abused
its discretion in denying -the motion. Varney v. Commonwealth, 201
Ky. 548, 275 S. W. 713. Where appellant, who was absent from the
court when the case was called on account of his being ill and unable
to be in court and default judgment was entered against him, appeared
in court three days later and filed a motion for a new trial, together
with an uncontroverted affidavit showing that he had a good defense
and was not guilty of the offense charged in the indictment, the court
vacated the judgment and granted him a new trial. Baker v. Com-
monwealth, 195 Ky 847, 243 S. W. 1049. Where a refusal of court to
vacate a default judgment and grant a new trial, on uncontradicted
affidavit of accused that train was late, it was held an abuse of the
trial court's discretion. Combs v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 200, 237 S.
W. 565. A new -trial was granted, where failure of appellant to be pres-
ent at the trial was due to a misleading statement of a deputy sheriff
and a Commonwealth's witness as to the day set for the trial of the
case. Damron v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 765, 265 S. W. 338.
It is impossible to conceive of how the ends of justice would have
been furthered, by requiring appellant to pay a sum out of all propor-
tion to the offense committed, which was in effect an absence from court
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when trial was had. Such a punishment was certainly unfair. Under the
circumstances, the ends of justice demanded a new trial, where appel-
lant would have been permitted to make his defense, and a rendition
of a judgment in conformity to the facts on the merits of the case.
From the authoritative cases cited, It seems that the holding Is
correct. It is both logical and just. B. C.
DEDICATION-AxYTHING INDICATiNG OwNER's INTmo AND AccET.
.ANCE BY PuBuIo Aw ouNTs To "DEDICATIoN '  REspsEcIvn oF W n r .-
Appellant had formed two blocks out of certain property which he
owned just across the boundary from a small village in the adjacent
state. He divided the two blocks into thirty-six lots each. The plat was
made so that a street separated the two blocks, and another small alley
interesected the two blocks at right angles to the street. Appellee
filed a map of the plat with the county clerk, and with it'a dedication
to the public of the use of the streets and alleys as designated on the
plat. The lots were sold at public sale to different purchasers. Appel-
lants subsequently became the owners of all the lots. They then In-
closed the entire subdivision, including the street, by a fence. In the
subsequent suit to have the fence removed the court held, that anything
which fully Indicates the intention of the donor to dedicate, and the
acceptance thereof by the public will amount to "dedication," and may
be either with or without writing. Hedge, et al. v. Avenger, 221 Ky. 524,
290 S. W. 342.
The court In its holding reaffirmed the well established rule in this
and other jurisdictions. Kentucky has consistently held that anything
that fully indicates the intention of the donor to dedicate and the ac-
ceptance by the public will amount to a dedication. ,Tames v. City of
Louisville, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 447, 40 S. W. 912; Kentucky Refining Co. v.
Salvage, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 1071, 41 S. W. 288; South Covington & G.
St. Ry. v. Newport L. & A. Turnpike Co., 23 Ky. Law Rep, 68, 110 Ky.
691, 628 S. W. 687; City of Bloomfield v. Allen, 146 Ky. 34, 141 S. W.
400; City of Louisville v. Botts Acrm'x, 151 Ky. 578, 152 S. W. 529.
Throughout the other jurisdictions generally no formal acts of the
owner, or formal acceptance by the public is necessary to dedicate. An
intention on the part of the owner and some use made by the public
is sufficient. The intention of the owner with a use for the purpose in-
tended was the only requirement to dedicate a cemetery. Wormey v.
Wormley, 207 11. 411, 69 N. E. 865. An intention implied from the
acts of the owner sufficient to dedicate. Biddinger v. Bishop, 70 Ind. 244.
Other jurisdictions that follow: Brooks v. City of Topeka, 34 Kan. 277,
8 Pa. 392; Tracy v. Bittle, 213 Mo. 302, 121 S. W. 45; Herrington v.
Bobtk & Flinn, 252 Pa. 70, 97 A. 178, State v. Frank W. Carey. Real
Estate Co., 117 A. 432; Atlantic & W. R. B. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 119
S. E. 712; Draper v. Conner C. Walter Co., 121 S. E. b9.
That an intention must be clearly manifest, either by words or
Implied from acts of the owner is particularly stressed. Hall v. McLeod,
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2 Mete. 98, 74 Am. D. 400. The court in that case said, "The'doctrine is
well established that dedication of real estate to public use' may be
made by mere verbal declarations, accompanied with such acts as are
necessary for that purpose. But to make a valid dedication, an inten-
tion to appropriate the right to the general use of the public must
exist." This requirement is upheld very rigidly. City of San Antonio
v. Sullivan 23 Tex. Civil App. 219, 57 S. W. 42; Spier v. Town of New
Utrecht, 2 N. Y. S. 426, 24 N. E. 692; Vance v. Village of Pewana, 126 N.
W. 978, 161 Mich. 528; Champ v. Nichole's County Court, 72 W. Va. 475,
'785 N. E. 361; City of Norfolk v. Southern R. Y. Co., 117 'Va. 101, 87 S.
E. 1085; Lynbrook Homes v. Tracy, 216 N. Y. S. 351, 217 App. Div. 164;
Bomar v. City of Baton Rouge, 4 La. App. 232, 110 S. 497.
There can be no question of the donor's intention in the principal
case. Not only was a plat filed with the court clerk showing the streets
intended for the public use, but a written dedication also made.
H. C. C.
DEEDs-GRANTEE's RECORDING OF DEED SIGNED AND AanuowLEED BY
Wis ON LY Is MmERELY EvIDENc OF ACCEPTANCE OF CO3mPL-rE DELrvERY.
-A wife, who was the owner of a tract of land, signed and acknowl-
edged a deed, which was delivered to grantee, who accepted it and
caused it to be recorded. Her husband had not signed or acknowledged
it About three months later, the deed was withdrawn from the office
of the county court clefk by the grantee, and he presqated it to the
husband, who signed and acknowledged it. The wife knew nothing of
this. The grantee then had the deed recorded again. The deed, as pre-
pared, contained a provision that it was subject to an oil lease made
by the grantors. Later the lease being canceled, the question arose as.
to who had the title to the oil and gas under the tract of land. The
whole case turned on the question of the delivery and acceptance of the
deed as executed by the wife. Held, that there was not a complete de-
livery and'the deed was void. Brandenbrug et al. v. Botner et al., 221
Ky. 7, 297 S. W. 702.
It would seem that under Section 506 of the Kentucky Statutes,
which provides that a married woman may convey real property either
by joint deed of herself and husband, or by a separate instrument, and
it by the latter, the husband must convey first, the holding in this cdse
could not be otherwise, when the deed was not joint at the time it was
delivered to the grantee and since it could not be revived and made
joint by the subsequent signing and acknowledging by the husband, and
if it were possible to call it a separate instrument, still it would be
void for failure of the husband to convey first. It does not follow that
there has been a delivery of the deed from -the fact that at some time
It may have been in the possession of the grantee without any intention
on the part of the grantor to make a delivery. Dunbar v. Meadows,
165 Ky. 275, 176 S. W. 1167. Where there is no delivery, there cannot
be an acceptance either in fact or law. Kirby v. Hulette, 174 Ky. 257,
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192 S. W. 63; Zutton v. Gibson, 119 Ky. 422, 84 S. W. 335. In the case
of Justice v. Peters, 168 Ky. 583, 182 S. W. 611, the court said: "The
delivery may be actual, or it may be a constructive delivery, but in
either case, the intent of the grantor to transfer the title to the grantee
is essential and necessary to constitute delivery. This intention to
transfer the title must, however, be accompanied with some act of the
grantor, by which he parts with power and control over the deed for
the benefit of the grantee, for intention alone will not constitute de-
livery." A deed must be delivered and accepted by the grantee before
it becomes a valid deed. There seems to be no universal test, applicable
to all cases, whereby the sufficiency of delivery can be determined, and
it is impossible to state in exact terms what shall or shall not con-
stitute a delivery of a deed. A deed will not be regarded as delivered
while anything remains to be done by the parties who propose to
deliver it. In the instant case the court said: "If at the time the wife
signed and acknowledged this deed she delivered it to the grantee with
the understanding between them that it was to be signed by her hus-
band before the title passed, it was not a complete delivery nor a com-
plete acceptance by the grantee. The fact that the grantee had it re-
corded is only a circumstance showing that it was accepted by him as a
complete delivery, but that may be refuted by evidence to the con-
trary." This same view is taken by the courts in the following juris-
dictions. Where one undertakes to prove a deed, depending on it as a
valid instrument, and the delivery is denied by substantial evidence the
grantee is under the necessity of proving more than the mere record.
Piper v. Queeney, 127 Atl. 474 (Pa.). The presumption of the delivery
of a deed arising from the fact of its being recorded, is one that may be
rebutted and destroyed by counter evidence. Boardman v. Dean, 34
Pa. 252. The recording of a deed is prima facie evidence of its delivery
but such can be rebutted by counter evidence. Simon et ux. v. Le Bar,
220 N. Y. S. 763, 219 App. Div. 624. The record of a deed is only evi-
dence of delivery. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. et al. v. Parker,
254 Pac. 779 (Colo.). As delivery is a necessary part of the execution
of a deed, it follows that registration is only prima facie evidence of
delivery. Bryan v. Rason, 147 N. C. 284, 61 S. E. 71.
There can be no doubt that the court in its holding in the instant
case was controlled to a considerable extent by Section 506 of the Ken-
tucky Statutes, but the same holding without a statute would not have
been without authority from the casas cited. B. C.
E VIDENCE-PIlESUMIED THAT CITY PUBLISHED ORDINAN-CB IN CITY
NnWSPArER AS REQULIFD BY STATUTE-Plaintiff, after a favorable vote
of its citizens, decided to improve its streets and sewers at the expense
of abutting property owners. Accordingly an ordinance to this effect
was passed and the street improvements made. The defendant, an abut-
ting property owner, found no fault with the improvements except his
having to pay for them. He refused to pay the assessment against his
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property and attacked the validity of the ordinance by questioning its
adoption and advertisement. Held, since the statute required the city
te publish its ordinances in the city newspaper, the presumption was
that the city officials did their duty. WalZace v. City of Louisa, 217 Ky.
419, 273 S. W. 720.
By Kentucky Statutes, section 3638, all city ordinances are re-
quired to be published in the city newspaper. The copy of the ordinance
filed with the petition in the above case was a newspaper copy, and from
this copy there was nothing which imputed any irregularity in -the
adoption or advertisement of the ordinance. The court in handing
down this decision has merely reiterated a well established legal pre-
cedent, in Kentucky, that where the record of the proceedings of the
council, in the adoption of a city ordinance, shows no irregularity on
its face it will be presumed that the council, in the adoption of such
ordinance, has complied with the provisions of the law. And it is
incumbent upon the one denying its validity to show affirmatively, by
facts other than the record, that there has been some irregularity in
Its passage. Baler, Mayor v. Comlbs, 194 Ky. 260, 239 S. W. 56; N~evin
v. Roach, 86 Ky. 498, 5 S. W. 546; Lexington v. Headley, 5 Bush 608;
Bates v. Monticello, 173 Ky. 244, 190 S. W. 1074; Muir v. Bardstown,
120 Ky. 739, 87 S. W. 1096, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 1150.
The Federal Court goes even further and says, that the power exer-
cised in passing an ordinance is presumed to be reasonable and the
one seeking to invalid'ate the ordinance must show affirmatively that
the city council acted wantonly, maliciously, through bribery, or with-
out authority, otherwise the presumption is in favor of the legality of
-the action. Grand Trunk Western Railway Company v. City of South
Bend, 33 S. Ct. 303, 227 U. S. 544, 57 L. Ed. 633.
The state courts likewise are practically unanimous in holding
that in the absence of proof to the contrary public officials are presumed
to do their duty, in a legal manner. Miles v. Baley, 170 .Cal. 151, 149
P. 45; People v. Schencc, 252 Ill. 451, 96 N. E. 864; Sloan v. City of
Cedar Rajids, 161 Iowa 307, 142 N. W. 970; City of Rome v. Whites-
ton Waterworks Company, 187 N. Y. 542, 80 N. E. 1106; Pendleton
v. Briggs, 37 t. 1. 471, 92 A. 1024.
From the above mentioned cases it is evident that the case now
tinder consideration merely adds emphasis to a well settled legal pre-
,umption, that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the acts of
public officials and assemblies are strictly in accord with the provisions
of the law. J. C. B.
]XECUTION-EXECUTION SALVE CANNOT BE SEP AsIDE Pon INADEQUACY
or CoNsiDERATIoN, WixEnE LAND BROUG11T MORE THAN Two-TH=Ds OF
APPRAISED VALUE AND FRAUD on. MisTAIE OF APPRAISEE is NOT ALLEGED.
-An attempt was made to set aside an execution sale on the ground of
inadequacy of consideration. The evidence was that the land brought
$1,262 whereas the appraised valuation was $1,400. While the weight
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of the evidence was that the land was in fact worth $2,500 there was
no allegation of fraud or mistake on the part of the appraisers. Held,.
the execution sale could not be set aside under such circumstances-
Runyon et at. v. Bevine et a., 218 Ky. 589, 291 S. W. 1033.
The law in regard to inadequacy of consideration in an execution
sale when not coupled with other objections has been so well settled by
the earlier Kentucky cases that until the instant case the point has not
arisen for some thirty-five :ears in Kentucky. The rule of the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals has been without exception that inadequacy ofT
consideration is not of itself ground for setting aside an execution sale.
PIansfor v. Barbour, 10 Ky. 515; WaZer v. Tate, 43 Ky. 519; Robb v.
Hannah's Executor, 12 Ky. Law Rep. 361, 14 S. W. 360.
In the case last cited above the court spplied the same general
rule as to when the consideration was beyond all objection as to its
adequacy, namely, when the sale price is two-thirds of the appraised"
value. The same rule had been applied earlier in the 'case of Valan-
dingham v. Worthington, 85 Ky. 32, 2 S. W. 772. In that case as in the
present the sale price was two-thirds of the appraised value but less
than two-thirds of the true value. In that case as in the present the
appraised valuation controlled.
While the two-thirds rule appears equitable, may we not ask
whether or not it is conclusive as to the exact line between the un-
objectionable and the objectionable. Might not the price be less than
two-thirds of the appraised value and yet be unobjectionable as to
adequacy? The origin of the two-thirds rule teems traceable to Gen-
eral Statutes, chapter 38, article 12, sections 2, 4, which provided that
before a sale of land under execution the proper officer should have It
valued, and, if it failed to sell for two-thirds of such valuation the
owner might redeem within a year. See the Vallandingham case, supra.
A like provision obtains at present in Kentucky Statutes, section 1648.
While the statute applies only to redemption, its influence upon direct
proceedings to set aside an execution sale is quite patent. It appears
quite unlikely that when the proper case arises any hard and fast rule
such as the two-thirds rule should- be applied. The more likely rule
would be as in other jurisdictions, namely, that the sale will be set
aside when and only when "the inadequacy Is so great as to shock the
conscience of a chancellor," Vagener v. Yetter, 280 Pa. 229, 124 A. 487.
The facts of the present case do not require, however, that the court go
beyond the unquestioned two-thirds rule in its statement of the law.
G. R.
HoIcIE--ADMITTING DYING DECLA:ATION THAT DEFENDANT SHOT
DECEASED HELD PnEJUDIcIAL ERROR WHERE EviDENCE AGAINST DEFENDANT
wAs CrncumsTANTIAL.-Appellant was convicted of murder. The dying
declaration of the deceased, shown conclusively to be mere opinion and
conclusion and -therefore incompetent, was admitted in evidence against
appellant. All the other evidence tending to show the latter's guilt was
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entirely circumstantial, and there was some evidence tending to estab-
lish an alibi. On appeal the state contended that the admission of -the'
dying declaration under the circumstances was not prejudicial error.
Held, that the admission of the dying declaration was prejudicial error
when all, the other evidence against appellant was entirely circumstan-
tial. Stevens v. Commonweath,.221 Ky. 222, 298 S. W. 678.
Sections 340 and 353 of the Kentucky Criminal Code provide that
a judgment shall be reversed for any errors of -law when it appears
itpon the consideration of the whole case that the rights of the de-
fendant have been prejudiced thereby. Under these sections of the Code
the Kentucky Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that where the
verdict in a homicide case is supported by other competent evidence, the
admission of an improper dying declaration does not constitute preju-.
dicial error, and is not grounds for reversal. Winstead v. Common-
wealth, 195 Ky. 484, 243 S. W. 40; Cavanaugh v. Commonwealth, 172 Ky.
799, 190 S. W. 123. It must appear that the verdict could not be sup-
ported in the minds of the jury but for the dying declaration in order
to be prejudicial. Farley v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 35, 291 S. W. 734.
This seems to be the general rule throughout the majority of state
jurisdictions. People v. Harzano, 212 N. Y. 231, 106 N. E. 87; Turner v.
State, 89 Tenn. 547, 15 S. W. 838.
This rule of law was particularly urged by the state on appeal in
the instant case as grounds for sustaining the verdict, but the court
based the reversal on the fact that all the other evidence of guilt was
circumstantial, -therefore the right of the defendant must have been
prejudiced in the eyes of the jury. Logically this seems sound and is
in accord with former Kentucky decisions. Gree v. Commonwealth,
13 Ky. Law Rep. 897, 18 S. W. 515. In that case the court said: " .
In a case where the conviction must depend greatly on evidence of a
circumstantial character, this court cannot well adjudge that incom-
petent testimony (dying declaration) was not prejudicial to his sub-
stantial rights."
In a case directly in point, the New York court agrees with the
instant case. Peo-ple v. Mikulec, 202 N. Y. S. 551. There the court dis-
tinguished the leading case of People v. Barzano, supra. In pointing
out the distinction the court was of the opinion that in the Sarzano
case the admission of the dying declaration played no part, or should
lave played no part at enabling -the jury to reach a verdict of guilty,
while in the case under consideration, in view of the circumstantial
evidence " . . . it may well have been the pivotal point in the case,
and certainly may have had a potential influence on the minds of the
jury." W. C. S.
LARCENY-CHECK MAY BE SUBJECT oF LABCExY.-C and G were in-
dicted by the grand jury, and accused of grand larceny, the stolen prop-
erty being a check for $30.00 They were tried and convicted. Their
motion for a new trial was overruled and they appealed, urging as one
271.
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ground for reversal, the insufficiency of the indictment and error of the
court in overruling the demurrer filed thereto. One question thus pre-
sented was: Whether a check is a proper subject of larceny? Held: That
under Kentucky Statutes, section 1161, providing that larceny of bills
of exchange shall be felony and Negotiable Instruments Act (Kentucky
Statutes 1922, section 3720b-185), providing that a check is a bill of ex-
change, a check may be the subject of larceny. Clines v. Commonwealth.
221 Ky. 461, 293 S. W. 1107.
Bonds, bills and notes and other written instruments promising
or directing the payment of money were not subjects of larceny at
common law, for the reason that such instruments were only evidence of
a right and a mere right wag not such a thing as could be stolen. United
States v. Davis, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14930, 5 Mason 356; Culp v. State, 1
Port. (Ala.) 33, 26 Am. Dec. 357; Young v. People, 193 Ill. 236, 61 N. E.
1104. But the rule that instruments evidencing pecuniary obligations
are not subjects of larceny has been almost entirely abrogated by stat-
utes. People v. Silbertrust, 236 Ill. 144, 86 N. E. 203; People v. Gregg, 70
Mich. 168, 135 N. W. 970; State v. McClellan, 82 Vt. 361, 73 Atl. 933.
The statute in this state which modifies the common law rule is
section 1161, Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, which says, "Robbery or
larceny of obligations, bonds, deeds, wills, bills obligatory, or bills of
exchange, promissory notes for 'the payment of money, paper bills of
credit, certificates of deposit of money with any bank or other person
or certificates or obligations granted by the .authority of this Common-
wealth, that of the United States, or any of them, or of account books
or receipts, shall be felony; and any person guilty of such felony shall
be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than two
nor more than ten years." It will be noted that -the statute does not
mention checks as a subject of larceny, The court in the principal case
did not find it necessary to determine whether a check might be classi-
fied as an "obligation" or included under one of the other choses in
action mentioned in the statute. The Negotiable Instruments Act was
adopted in Kentucky in 1904. Section 3720b-185 Kentucky Statutes,
which is part of the Negotiable Instruments Act, says: "A check is a
bill of exchange dfawn on a bank, payable on demand." Thus the
court concluded that section 1161 Kentucky Statutes enlarging the
common law so as to include theft of choses in action, as aided by the
definition contained in the Negotiable Instruments Act, makes it lar-
ceny to steal a check.
A check was held the subject of larceny under statute in the fol-
lowing jurisdictions. State v. Wegener, 180 Iowa 102, 162 N. W. 1040;
People v. Lovejoy, 37 App. Div. 52, 55 N. Y. S. 543; Fulshear v. State,
59 Tex. Cr. 376, 123 S. W. 134; State v. Levine, 79 Conn. 714, 66 Atl. 529.
Although there are no funds in a bank to meet a check it is the subject
of larceny. Roberts v. State, 181 Ind. 520, .104 N. E. 970. Though the
check be unindorsed it may still be subject of larceny under statute.
State v. Hinton, 56 Ore. 428, 109 Pac. 24.
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It is submitted that the decision of the Kentucky Court is clearly
correct under the statute, and in accord with the prevailing rule in
this country. R. R. R.
MASTER AND SERVANT.-WIFE HELD Nor LIABLE UNDER "FAMILY
PuRPosi" DOCTrINE, FOR INJURY BY HER AUTOmOBILE DRIVEN BY HUSBAND
IN nis Busnmss. -Appellant was injured by a car driven by appellee's
husband. The car was owned by the appellee, and used by her for
purely family purposes, principally tor pleasure. The husband had a
general permission to use the car, and occasionally did so. On the
morning of the accident he had driven his wife's daughter to school,
but when the accident itself occurred he was using the car in his own
private business, having left the child at school several hours before.
Appellant sued appellee and her husband jointly and severally. Held,
that when the head of the family is using a motor car belonging to
another member of the family, the owner is not liable for negligence
under the family purpose doctrine. Kennedy v. Wolfe, 221 Ky. 111,
298 S. W. 188.
The family purpose doctrine was adopted by Kentucky in 1912.
Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386, 144 S. W. 52. The court at that time ex-
pressed the view that if a father purchased an automobile for the
pleasure of his family and a child used the car, the father was liable
for the child's negligence upon the grounds of impl'ed agency. The
courts throughout the country, however, are in hopeless conflict upon
this doctrine. Crittenden v. Murphi, 36 Cal. App. 803, 173 Pac. 595.
17an Blaricor v. Dodgson, 220 X. Y. 111, 115 N. E. 443.
In the instant case the Kentucky Court of Appeals has sought to
limit in extent what it considers to be a dangerous rule of law. It is
called "at best a harsh doctrine." The court followed closely the logic
applied to similar facts in Rauckhorst v. Kraut, 216 Ky. 323, 287 S. W.
895. There the car belonged to the mother, and it was sought to hold
the mother liable for the negligence of her twenty-three-year-old son
in driving the car upon his own business. The court refused to hold
the mother liable, holding that the son's use of the car did not fall
within the family purpose doctrine.
There is much conflict In other jurisdictions. In Smith v. Weaver,
124 N. E. (Ind. App.) 503, it was held that the wife was not liable where
the husband was using the machine for his own purposes. The wife
was held liable in Allen. v. Hol ler, 199 App. Div. 750, 192 N. Y. Supp.
351, but the evidence showed that the husband was driving his wife at
the time, and that the errand upon which they were going was of
mutual concern to both.
It would seem therefore that most courts adhering to the family
purpose doctrine attempt to justify it upon the grounds of agency. See
llutchins v. Haffner, 63 Col. 365, 167 Pac. 966. The Kentucky courts
take this view. Stowe v. Morris, supra. Assuming -that agency is the
proper criterion upon which to establish liability it would logically
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follow that where one spouse Is using the other's cir for his or her own
private business, as An the! instant case, there can be no relation of
principal and agent, and hence no liability.
Where the object of the spouse when driving is purely one of
pleasure the courts in states adhering to the doctrine more readily hold
the owner of the car liable. Plaseh v. Fass, 144 Minn. 44, 174 N. W. 438.
A large number of jurisdictions reject the entire doctrine. Van,
BlaricQm v. Dodgson, supra; Watkins v. Clark, 103 Kan. 629, 176 Pac.
631. Certainly the Kentucky court would have been greatly extending
the docrtine as already applied had it held the defendant liable in the
instant case. W. C. S.
NEGLIGENcE-PASSENGER HELD NoT GumTy oF CoNTRImTOnY. NEGL.-
GENCE, AS A MATTEB OF LAW, iN RinrnG iN AuToMoBIRE Wrrn KmowiN
FAST DnvE.-The appellant had moved before the trial court for per-
emptory instruction and was overruled. The appellee was suing the
appellant for anl injury sustained through the negligence of the appel-
lant in driving an automobile in which the appellee was riding. The
appellant made his motion on the ground that the appellee, knowing
that the appellant was a fast and reckless driver, was guilty of contrib-
utory negligence. The court overruled the motion on the ground that
as a matter of law it Is sufficient for the judge to decide and thereby
give peremptory instruction. Held, affirmed, motion was properly over-
ruled. New York Indemnity Co. v. Ewen, 221 Ky. 114, 298 S. W. 182.
The Kentucky court was correct in its holding according to the
great weight of authority. What constitutes negligence is a matter of
law to be decided by the court, but as to whether negligence exists as
a matter of fact in a particular ease is a matter for the jury to decide.
'Wilmington City RBy. Co. v. White, 66 A. 1009; Short v. Philadelphia B.
& W. Ry., 76 A. 363.
Negligence whether contributory or otherwise is a mixed question
of law and fact to be decided by the court only when the facts are un-
disputed or conclusively proved: Cf. U. C. & gt. L. Ry. Co. v. Houghland,
85 N. E. 369, 74 Ind. App. 73; Cardwell v. X. & W. Ry. Co., 114 Va.
500; C. & A. Ry. Co. v. Paris Adm., 68 S. E. 398, 111 Va. 41. In the case
at hand the appellee did know that the appellant was a fast driver,
but there was also evidence to 'show that the appellant never before
had had an accident and that the appellee had requested appellant to
drive carefully. Thp trial court was correct in refusing the appellant's
motion and referring the facts to the jury. The court must determine
whether any facts have been established from which negligence may
be inferred reasonably but the jury must determine whether from those
facts negligence should be inferred. Baltimore Refrigeration & Heating
Go. v. Kreiner, 71 A. 1066, 109 Md. 361; Turbyfill v. Atlanta, C. Airline
By. Co., 65 S. E. 278, 83 S. C. 325. For the court to decide as a matter
of law the inferences must all lead to but one conclusion. -Virgin v.
Lake Erie & W. Ry. Co., 101 N. E. 50, 55 Ind. App. 216.
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The Kentucky Court was right in refusing the appellant's motion
-for peremptory instructions because according to the weight of author-
-ity it was not a matter of law for the court to decide. R. B. B.
TAxATioN.-DiscR mxNATIo0 AGAINST TAxPAyER WnL NoT AUTHOR-
IZE REmLn, UNL~ss rr is TA TAMOU17T TO INTENTIONAL DiscnImiNATIoN
my TAxING AuTomRTms.-Plaintiff who owned shares of stock in two
grocery companies assessed the stock on a basis of 70 per cent. of its
actual value. The board of supervisors of the county increased his
assessment to the full value. He alleges that the supervisors could not
legally do this because "the uniform valuation of property in that
county for distiict, county and state taxation for that year was not in
excess of a sum equal to 70 per cent. of its value and hence plaintiff's
pioperty for taxation for that year should be valued at not exceeding
70 per cent. of its actual value, estimated at the price it would bring
at a fair voluntary sale." Held: That plaintiff was not entitled to
relief if his property was overvalued by mere ehance or without his
showing that there had been such discrimination against him as was
tantamount to an intentional discrimination on the part of the taxing
authorities Stler v. Board of Supervisors of Whitley City, 221 Ky. 100,
298 S. W. 189.
An arbitrary or capricious valuation by the board of equalization
is objectionable and may be set aside. Allen v. Emery Independent
School Distrwct, 283 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 674. The general rule has
been stated thus: B raud, capriciousness or want of the exercise of an
honest judgment by tax officers is ground for, interfering with their
action, if the assessment made is grossly disproportionate to the prop-
erty's value, or unequal when compared with the assessment of other
like property. German-American Lumber Co. v. Barbee, 59 Fla" 493,
52 So. 292; Northern Pacifip Ry. Co. v. Pierce County, 55 Wash: 108,
104 Pac. 178. In the former case the court said, "a tax assessor has a
wide discretion in valuing property for taxation, and the courts will
not in general control such discretion in the absence of a clear show-
ing of fraud, illegal act or an abuse of discretion r ndering an assess-
ment authorized by law so arbitrary and discriminating as to amount
to fraud upon the taxpayer or a denial of the equal protection of the
law." If the assessment be based on an overvaluation so excessive as
to require the conclusion that it did not arise from error in judgment,
but was arbitrarily and intentionally made, the court will grant relief.
People v. St. Louis Electric Bridge Co., 290 Ill. 307, 125 N. E. 280.
On the other hand, mere overvaluation in the absence of improper
conduct, or unless -the excess is so gross as to impute fraud to the
assessor is not ground for interference with the valuation fixed by the
board of equalization. Allen v. Emery Independent School District,
supra; Northern Pacific By. Go. v. Pierce County, supra; People v.
Hibernian Banking Association, 245 Ill. 522, 92 N. E. 305. The latter
case expressed the view, that while circumstances in connection with
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the overvaluation of property for taxation may be sufficient to establish
the fraudulent character of an assessment, so as to warrant intervention
by the courts, overvaluation alone is insufficient. The minority view,
that overvaluation alone is sufficient to entitle taxpayer to relief seems
to be taken by only one state. Iowa Cent. Ry. Co. v. Board of Review
of Eliot Township of Louisa County, 176 Iowa 131, 157 N. W. 731, where
it was held that though property of taxpayer is assessed at less than
its true value, yet if it is assessed higher proportionately than other
property he has a just cause for complaint. Barz v. Board of Equaliza-
tion of Town of Klemme, 133 Iowa 563, 111 N. W. 41.
A case of unlawful discrimination may be made out in a proper
state of case, but more must be shown than mere overvaluation. The
work done by the taxing officers, through the machinery provided by
the General Assembly cannot be so easily set aside. The principal
case, where nothing more than overvaluation is shown is not one where
relief should be granted. The decision of the Kentucky court seems
sound and is supported by the overwhelming weight of authority.
R. R. R.
WIIERE DEFI-.DANT DID NOT KNOW IIIAT JUROR HAD SERVED ON GRAND
JuaY WnIcir FoUND TIIE INI)ICTMENT ANI) FACT WAS NOT DIsCLOsED ON
•EXA ININATIO%,, DEFE.NDANT WAS E NTITLEI TO NEW TRIAL.-The appellant
was convicted in the trial court and brought this appeal on the ground
that the trial court had erred in oveiruling a motion for a new trial.
It was contended and proved by the appellant that after the verdict
had been returned he discovered that one of the jurors of the trial panel
had served on the grand jury which had returned the indictment. Upon
this ground the appellant made his motion for a new trial, which was
overuled by the trial court. Held: The appellant was entitled to a new
trial. Murphy v. Commonwcalth, 221 Ky. 217, 298 S. W. 671.
By section 210 of the Criminal Code of Kentucky, the appellant
was entitled to challenge the juror on the ground of implied bias, "If
the juror has served on the grand jury which found the indictment."
In the case at hand the appellant was deprived of that right and it can
not be said that appellant had a trial by a fair and impartial jury to
which he is unquestionably entitled.
In the case of U. S. v. Christensen, 7 Utah 26, 5 Pac. 543, it was
held that where a juror on his voir dire answers that he has formed
no opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused and it is discov-
ered after the verdict that he has formed such opinion, the party con-
victed is entitled to a new trial. In Bennet v. State, 24 Wis. 57, and
Peoplc v. Lewis, 4 Utah 42, 5 Pac. 543, the same principle has been
adopted. Kentucky courts have followed this doctrine in cases where
negative answers have been falsely given. Mansfield Y. Commonwealth,
163 Ky. 48S. 174 S. W. 16; Leadlinghai v. Com., 180 Ky. 38, 201 S. W. 500.
The lower court would likely have been affirmed had the appellant
through some negligence of his counsel failed to get the proper informa-
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tion concerning the qualifications of the juror or had he known of the
disqualifications of the juror and failed to disclose such knowledge
until the verdict was returned, such failure serving as a waiver to his
right. However those are not the facts in this case and the upper
court was correct in its decision according to the weight of authority.
R. B. B.
WIrLs.DAuGnTER TO WHOx TESTATOR DEVIS PROPERTy INcLuDo-
ING INSURANCE WHEREIN SHE mAS BENmIcIARY, HAD DUTY OF ELECTING
To ACCEPT WIL. on RETAIN INSURANCE AND FORFEIT RIGHTS UNDER THE
W'Ln.-.-Testator set out in his will that his estate, valued at $60,000.00,
be sold and the proceeds placed in trust with a policy for $11,000.00 on
his life in which the daughter was beneficiary; the datIghter, an only
child then 16 years old, was to receive the income from this combined
fund until she reached the age of 25, when the trust fund was to be
distributed to her in stated annual installments. In case she died
without issue and before the time of distribution, testator bequeathed
the fund, after certain specific legacies, to be divided equally among
his surviving relatives. The daughter died testate, aged 21, unmarried,
and there were claims against her estate amounting to $4,000.00 for
expenses of her last illness, funeral, etc., in excess of income. Held,
that testator's devise of insurance, to which he had no title, in trust
with his own estate, was sufficiently clear to require an election by the
daughter either to accept under the will, or to take the insurance
policy which was entirely hers; that from the evidence, she fully
appreciated the situation and by implication of law elected to accept
under the will. It follows, then, that the corpus of -the estate, includ-
ing the isurance, passes by the will to the testator's donees and that
the daughter's maternal relatives have no claim on the insurance.
TWooten's Trustee v. Hardy, 221 Ky. 338, 298 S. W. 963.
The doctrine of election as exemplified by the principal case is well
stablished in England and the United States. Dillon v. Parker, 1
Swanst. 396 (36 Eng. Reprints 443); Pitman v. Ewing, 1911 A. C. 217,
Morath v. Weber, 124 Ky. 128, 98 S. W. 321, 30 Ky. L. R. 284, and a host
of other authorities. To require election it must be shown that there
was a clear intention on testator's part to dispose of property over
whose disposition he has not, as against the party put to his election,
the power of disposal, and in compensation the testator gives property
he absolutely owns, so that the will shows an intention on testator's
part that the beneficiary shall choose whether he will keep what is
already his or renounce it and take what testator gives him. Jackson
v. Bevins, 74 Conn. 96. Conditions requiring donees to release property
rights of their own are valid. If the gift is accepted, it must be taken
subject to the burden. One cannot claim under the will and against
it at the same time. Rood on Wills, sec. 625 (1926).
The Roman rule was much simpler and possibly more logical.
Where a testator bequeathed something which did not belong to him
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It was the duty of the heir to go out and buy it for the beneficiary, on
the theory that as it appeared in the will, it was the testator's intention
that he should have it. Where this was impossible, as in a bequest of
the Campus Martius or a temple, the whole bequest failed. If it were
not possible from the will to discern the intention of the testator
regarding the res aliena, the bequest also failed for the reason as given
in the Institutes; Forsitan enim, si scisset alienam, non legasset. Pit-
man v. Ewing (1911) A. C. 217.
"In order that an act may amount to an election, two things are
essential. first, it must be clear that the person alleged to have elected
was aware of the nature and extent of his rights; second, it must be
shown that, having that knowledge, he intended to elect. 11 Am. &
Eng. Enc. of Law, 2d ed. 97. Both these requisites are satisfied in the
principal case, which is in line with practically all of the authorities,
both in this country and in England. G. L. B.
WITNEssEs-IirvnRED PASSENGER HELD NOT DISQUALIFIED TO TEsTY
AS TO AcTS OF DEcEAsED ENGINEER; RAILROAD HAVING BEEN CONSTRUC-
TIVELY PRESENT AT THE ACoIDENT IN THE PERSON OF THE CONDUOTOR.-
Plaintiff, a passenger on defendant's train, was severely injured by fall-
ing from the train while it was in motion. Plaintiff stated at the trial
that a sudden jerk of the train caused by some manipulation of the
engineer hurled him from the train thereby causing the injury. At
the time this evidence was offered the engineer was dead and the de-
fendant relying on the "act done or omitted to be done" clause of sec-
tion 606 of the Civil Code of Kentucky contended that plaintiff's testi-
mony was not admissible. Held: The railroad was constructively pres-
ent in the person of the conductor and therefore the death of the en-
gineer did Iiot disqualify plaintiff's testimony 'concerning the accident.
Burkc v. Louisville and Noshville Railroad Company, 218 Ky. 163, 292
S. W. 486.
Section 605 of the Civil Code of Kentucky seeks by one broad sweep
to abolish in Kentucky that fear and distrust of juries which Anglo-
Saxon jurisprudence had built up under the reign of the common law.
Walton v. Shelley, 1 T. R. 300. Consequently all disqualifications of
witnesses were swept away except those preserved in section 606.
The Kentucky Code seems unique in including "acts done or
omitted to be done," but the Kentucky Court is in full accord with
the great majority of courts in giving similar provisions a very wide
and comprehensive meaning. Morris v. Norton, 75 Fed. 912, 21 C. C.
A. 553; Holcomb v. HUolcomb, 95 N. Y. 316; North American Accident
Insurance Company v. Caskcy's Administrator, 218 Ky. 756, 292 S.
W. 297.
In construing statutes the courts, in so far as it is feasible, are
guided by the intention of the legislative bodies enacting them. From
a survey of the judicial interpretation given similar statutes in other
jurisdictions it appears that they are intended to apply only to suits
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against the administrator or executor of the deceased's estate or where
one of the parties sues or defends as the representative of the decedent
or incompetent. Fitzsimmons v. Southwick, 38 Vt. 509; Knox v. Bige-
low, 15 Wis. 455; Jones v. Subra, 25 S. W. 223.
Since the primary purpose of such statutes is to prevent perjury
and the perpetration of fraud, it seems that the defendant in the present
case, was seeking to defeat the purpose of the statute by giving it a
perverted judicial interpretation and the court was quick to perceive
that the defendant, being a corporation, was an artificial person and
consequently could not be present in body. As such it was construc-
tively present in the person of its several agents at the time of the
accident and therefore it cannot affect the plaintiff's testimony that one
of its agents, who perhaps was responsible for the accident, was dead.
These agents could have testified concerning the disputed "jerk" of the
train and even the engineer's testimony at a former trial of the case
could have been introduced.
The essence of this provision of the Code was taken from the New
York Code. Dembitz's, Kentucky Jurisprudence, ch. 1. And the New
York Court has held that the statute in that state is to apply in actions
against the estate of the deceased. Heyne v. Dorflier, 57 Hun. 591,
10 N. Y. Supp. 908.
Under all the circumstances and in the light of what must clearly
have been the intention of the legislature in passing such a statute it
Is submitted that this decision of the court is based on legal logic,
common justice, and fair play in preventing the defeat of the purpose
of this statute by giving it an extra-intentional interpretation.
J. C. B.
